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Introduction
In their review of multinational companies (MNCs) in this journal last year, our
colleagues (Muller-Camen et al., 2001) explored the interaction of home and host
country effects on subsidiary operations. They concluded that the location of MNCs
in different national business systems provides variable attitudes towards employee
relations. A large body of literature on US MNCs in Europe suggests that they seek
to transfer practices from their home base and act as innovators in areas such as pay
and work organization. These home country practices may challenge national sys-
tems of collective representation and bargaining (Almond, Edwards and Muller,
2001). Muller-Camen et al. (2001) temper this general conclusion by suggesting that
national business systems, particularly components of the industrial relations system,
exhibit extensive variation across the EU and remain a strong influence on the behav-
iour of MNCs.
In reviewing this past year, we are obliged to continue this line of analysis but
also to extend it. Key consequences for multinational behaviour have been generated
by two related events; developing economic recession, particularly in so far as it
affected American markets, and the amplifying effect on this of the events of
September 11 2001. Shock effects were felt first and most in two key internationalised
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sectors. Airlines were hit immediately by the temporary closure of American airspace
and the medium-term impact on demand for transatlantic routes. Information tech-
nology companies have had to weather continued shifts in demand for their product,
exacerbated by recession. Since news and business coverage for the year cohered
substantially around these two areas, we adopt a similar focus. Doing so prompts
us to add to the analytical themes of home and host country. To what extent has the
subsequent restructuring within and between companies been sector specific? Under
what circumstances do such sector effects become significant and how are they tem-
pered by broader home and host country influences? These two industries offer inter-
esting contrasts on questions of this kind; though both are now intrinsically trans-
national, they are structured quite differently. In terms of employment, airlines
remain concentrated in their home countries but information technology, particularly
the production of hardware has become much more dispersed.
The paper proceeds through two sections. The first reviews recent domestic indus-
trial relations developments in three European countries that are likely to impact on
MNCs. Thematically, this cursory review aims to draw out the potential destabilising
effects of MNCs on national structures and systems—namely works council rights
in Germany, non-unionism and rights to bargain legislation in Ireland and aspects
of labour market reform in Spain. More substantively section two examines the issues
of sector and sector effects on MNCs in the broader context of September 11, in
particular its ramifications for industrial relations in civil aviation and information
technology.
Foreign direct investment, MNCs and contemporary industrial
relations developments in Germany, Ireland and Spain
Germany—merger and acquisition activity and investment by MNCs
The Mannesmann Vodafone merger provides an opportunity to review MNC activity
in Germany in the context of emergent pressures to regulate cross border mergers
and investment activity. In this context two major legal developments, which high-
light the significance of the German industrial relations system are examined.
Cross border merger and acquisition activity has a major impact on industrial
relations in several respects. Firstly, following on from the level of FDI or the number
of employees in foreign-owned firms, merger and acquisition activity indicates the
general influence of MNCs on an economy. Secondly, post-merger restructuring has
social effects on employees, which, particularly in a phase of economic downturn
are reflected in collective redundancies. The European Commission calculates that
in 2001 merger and acquisition created 350,000 layoffs in Europe, (European Com-
mission, 2002).
In July 2001 the European Parliament attempted to introduce an EU-wide directive
to establish a well-regulated procedure for take-overs. This attempt failed in the main
because of opposition from the German automobile and chemical sectors, (FAZ,
2001d). As a result of the EU’s failure the German Parliament passed a national law
that provides for mandatory regulation of take-overs. The legislation concedes more
defensive measures to the Vorstand (board of directors) in the case of an attempted
take-over.
A second legal development in 2001, which is expected to exert significant influ-
ence on German industrial relations, centres on legislation to reform the Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz—the works constitution Act, an issue of great interest to foreign
investors. This law has remained unchanged for thirty years but is now subject to
several major reforms. The participation rights of works councils in areas such as
environmental protection and racism are extended and the works council election
procedure simplified. Finally, the law enables more works councillors to be freed
from regular work per number of employees in a firm (EIRO, 2001a).
Among other lobby groups the American Chamber of Commerce—which with
3000 members is the largest bilateral economic federation in Europe—intervened in
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what was an intense dispute between trade unions and employer associations. Whilst
the American Chamber of Commerce accepted that collective employee represen-
tation is a proven guarantor of social peace in the workplace criticism from its mem-
bers was far reaching. Additional rights for works councillors will drive up costs
and lead to greater bureaucracy affecting small to medium sized firms in particular.
Moreover, the Chamber argued that national legislation of this type impairs the pro-
cess of harmonization of business conditions across the EU (ACC, 2001). As a result
of these concerns the American Chamber of Commerce predicts a decline in the
propensity of MNCs to undertake FDI in Germany.
However, this position contrasts strongly with arguments put forward by Ger-
many’s minister for FDI, Hilmar Kopper who argues that in the first three months
of 2001 FDI in Germany totalled 43 billion with the US leading the list followed by
the UK, the Netherlands and France. Further, it appears that business leaders in US
MNCs may hold different views on the attractiveness of Germany as a location for
FDI than that formulated by the American Chamber of Commerce. For example,
Aharon Mirsky, Motorola general Manager in Berlin argues that Germany ‘is the
place where decisions about technology are made’ which go on to determine the
wider European market (Handelsblatt, 2001). Other business leaders emphasise the
strategic importance of Germany as a gateway to eastern European markets, parti-
cularly important with the prospect of further EU enlargement.
In summary the key issue that results from domestic legislation centres on its
effects on FDI by MNCs and industrial relations in MNCs. Germany may be a higher
labour cost economy than others and one where host regulation impairs the freedom
of MNCs to act unilaterally. However, there is considerable empirical evidence to
suggest that US MNCs in particular are prepared to trade-off higher labour costs in
respect of higher productivity levels, that is, low labour costs are not necessarily the
primary consideration in location decisions for FDI. Alternatively, the quality of the
labour force that is available is a significant factor, (Ifo Institute, 1997; Cooke and
Noble, 1998). Hence, whilst recent legislation in Germany may lead to better regu-
lation of merger and acquisition activity and improve the position of works councils
this may not deter FDI to any significant extent.
Ireland—FDI, MNCs, and contemporary industrial relations
Major economic, political and social changes characterise developments in the Irish
economy in recent years. Considerable capital investment leading to sustained
employment creation has combined with falling unemployment to result in an
appreciable rise in the overall living standard. For much of the past decade Ireland
was the OECD’s fastest growing economy with GDP increases averaging 9% per year
since 1994. However, quarterly national accounts released in February 2002 reveal
that GDP growth slowed to 3.2% in the third quarter of 2001, (CSO, 2002). Ireland’s
long-term unemployment rate stands at 1.2% and a recent report predicts economic
growth greater than the EU average but with slightly lower productivity which might
see modest increases in unemployment, (Creation, 2002). Moreover, as wage
increases are running ahead of productivity growth, competitive and productivity
gains secured in recent years may be undermined (Sheehan, 2001). The manufactur-
ing and service sectors has witnessed the bulk of economic and employment growth
and Ireland is host to a significant number of foreign-owned companies who account
for a considerable proportion of exports and employment. The trend over the past
ten years shows that more jobs were created in foreign-owned firms than domestic
firms, consequently, multinational investment combined with Ireland’s approach to
handling industrial relations are important in evaluating Ireland’s recent economic
performance.
Trends in FDI by MNCs in Ireland
Actively encouraging FDI by MNCs remains a key plank of Ireland’s contemporary
industrial policy. In a statement at the end of 2001, the Industrial Development Agen-
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cy’s (IDA) head noted that the global slowdown in the information and communi-
cation technology sector had generated ‘a small net loss’ in IDA backed employment.
However, the IDA expected to see a recovery in the course of 2002 and continues to
compete strongly for investments in other growing sectors. Ireland continues to offer
inward investors a package of financial incentives—most notably low levels of tax-
ation on profits and a range of other attractions such as its young workforce (47%
of the population is aged under 29) and a comparatively unregulated industrial
relations framework, (Gunnigle et al., 2002b). In following this approach Ireland is
particularly successful in attracting FDI with the result that the economy is signifi-
cantly more reliant on investment by MNCs than any other EU nation. Estimates
suggest that FDI accounts for one third of the industrial workforce, 55% of manufac-
turing output and 70% of industrial exports, (Tansey, 1998). Further, a recent 62
nation study revealed that Ireland is now the world’s most globalized economy,
ranked well ahead of other countries considered to have open economies such as
Singapore (3rd) and New Zealand (19th) (Brown, 2002).
There are 1,225 overseas firms operating in Ireland employing approximately
137,000 people with a particular focus on electronics, pharmaceuticals, software and
internationally traded services. The main sources of FDI are the USA (42.3%), Ger-
many (13.4%) and the UK (13.2%) (IDA). OECD data reveal a threefold increase in
FDI flows to Ireland since 1990, with the FDI by US MNCs now accounting for 85%
of all such inflows. The significance of US FDI was highlighted in the Economist’s
1997 finding that almost 25% of all US FDI in Europe—much of it non-union—is
located in Ireland, while during the period 1980–1997 40% of all new US FDI in the
electronics sector went to Ireland, (OECD, 2000). Ramifications of restructuring in
information technology are therefore particularly salient in Ireland and this is
explored later.
Contemporary industrial relations: union recognition and the right to bargain
Industrial relations have played a significant role in the Irish success story. Since
1986 a series of centrally negotiated accords were agreed by the social partners (state,
employers and trade unions). They represent the dominant feature in collective bar-
gaining in Ireland in recent years, (D’Art and Turner, 2000). These agreements deal
not only with pay, but also with a range of economic and social policy issues such
as welfare provision, employment creation and tax reform. Each has given the Irish
labour movement a pivotal role in shaping economic and social policy, see Gunnigle
et al. (2002b).
Despite this role, union density in Ireland continues to decline. Trade union recog-
nition now represents an area of significant debate, largely due to the fall in density
since the early 1980’s and concomitant rise in union avoidance strategies, particular
among multinational firms.
While the decline in union density reflects the impact of several factors, it is clear
that FDI has played a significant role. Current statistics indicate that density in 1999
was 44.5%. This represents a fall of almost 10% since 1994 in a period when employ-
ment has grown by a third, much of it in overseas, particularly US MNCs. In dis-
cerning the impact of FDI on union density, an important issue is the pattern of
union recognition itself. A study of firms in the manufacturing and internationally
traded services sector which covers green field sites over the period 1987–97 found
a particularly high incidence of non-union firms. For example, over the whole period
80% of US firms are non-union whereas for firms locating during the period 1992–
97 91% are non-union compared to 54% for the previous five years. The majority of
earlier period non-union firms were predominantly US owned firms in the infor-
mation communication and technology sector. However, for the 1992–97 period the
study found greater diffusion of union avoidance that embraces Irish and other Euro-
pean firms. Thus it appears that ‘innovative’ US human resource practice in non-
union firms broke new ground in this area and have encouraged a diffusion of new
non-union managerial strategies to both new FDI investment and indigenous firms.
However, in the current period recent right to bargain legislation is an important
MNCs in Europe 449 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002.
development. Historically, the absence of a statutory mechanism for union recog-
nition was less problematic than today as most employers tended to recognise and
conclude collective bargaining agreements. The sharp falls in density described
above—sustained and reinforced by FDI—prompted trade unions to seek a formal
procedure to support recognition claims.
Under the framework of the centrally negotiated Partnership 2000 agreement a ‘high
level group on trade union recognition’ was established to examine the issue. The
group comprises government members, the Irish business and employers confeder-
ation, the IDA and the Irish congress of trade unions. The groups’ initial report rec-
ommended the use of voluntary, as opposed to mandatory recognition procedures.
However, a high profile dispute between Ryanair and SIPTU and the airline’s refusal
to concede recognition to baggage handlers resulted in broader trade union disaffec-
tion with the high level group report and its provisions relating to voluntary recog-
nition procedures, (Gunnigle et al., 2002a,b). Amendments were subsequently made
and a revised report issued in March 1999 culminating in the Industrial Relations
(Amendment) Act in June 2001.
The high level group recommended a dual mechanism for dealing with disputes,
namely a voluntary procedure on dispute resolution with a statutory fall back mech-
anism. The voluntary procedure became operative in 2000 by statutory instrument.
In the event of negotiating arrangements failing to take place and the failure to move
to collective bargaining the procedure details the process that should be put into
place. This requires management and trade unions to co-operate in resolving the dis-
pute.
The Act provides for statutory dispute resolution on this matter but fails to contain
any provision for statutory union recognition. Here any determination issued by the
Labour court cannot explicitly provide for collective bargaining arrangements and
union recognition. Rather, the Act gives the Labour court the power, in particular
circumstances, to make a binding determination on matters relating to terms and
conditions of employment and procedures. The Act explicitly excludes any rec-
ommendation on collective bargaining arrangements. Non-union establishments who
can demonstrate the presence of good conditions of employment and effective dis-
putes procedures are effectively exempted for the legislation and investigation by
the Labour court. In this way D’Art and Turner (2002) suggest that while in practice
the legislation may improve employment relations practice and procedure it may
also legitimise non-unionism.
The initial surge of FDI into Ireland in the 1980s appears indicative of theories that
postulate a new international division of labour where MNC branch plants are
attracted by readily available and comparatively cheap supplies of labour,
(Henderson, 1989). This perspective sits uneasily with IDA claims that Ireland is, in
some sectors, the high-technology centre of Europe, for example McGovern (1998)
argues that there is some doubt on the R&D capability of US MNCs in Ireland.
However, evaluation of the IDA’s efforts to encourage value-added production must
be subject to continuing empirical research. Equally, the effects of Ireland’s right to
bargain legislation on trade union recognition appear strictly limited. As D’Art and
Turner (2002) note, comparatively the Irish legislation is much weaker than Britain’s
recognition provisions. This suggests that its effects on the diffusion of non-unionism
by US MNCs and its emergence as best practice for indigenous firms and MNCs
from other countries of origin is open to doubt.
Spain—FDI and pressures for reform of the labour market?
2001 ended in Spain with signs of an economic downturn. International recession,
before and after September 11 has clearly influenced policy makers in the country.
In respect of its EU Presidency, in the latter part of 2001, the Spanish government
stated its intention to open the energy and telecommunications sectors and reform
the labour market across the EU (Lavin, 2002). FDI in Spain was 37% lower in 2001
than in 2000, a reduction slightly less than UNCTAD’s 40% estimate. Other EU
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nations accounted for 66% of FDI in 200l with the UK emerging as the largest single
investor contributing 18% of the total, the majority of which was in the telecommuni-
cations sector.
2001 was a particularly complex year in Spain in respect of industrial relations and
labour market reform. The major reforms are highlighted below. Firstly, controversy
over the high costs of dismissal was subject to dialogue between the Government
and social partners, each of whom recognised that it has a significant impact on the
country’s comparatively high level of temporary employment (Eironline, 18-01-02,a).
Secondly, for 2002, the national minimum wage (Salario Mı´nimo Interprofesional,
SMI) will be increased by 2% taking into account the rate of inflation. The reaction
of major trade unions to this was immediate, as they had been expecting an increase
of around 7%, a figure more in accordance with the criteria of reviewing the SMI as
laid down in the scope of the Workers’ Statute (Eironline, 18–1–02,b). Currently,
Spain’s SMI is one of the lowest minimum wage levels within the EU, barely above
that of Portugal and Greece.
Thirdly, the Government, CC.OO (the major trade union) and the CEOE (the Span-
ish Confederation of Employers) signed an agreement culminating in the Flexible
Retirement System Act which became law on January 1, 2002. This agreement aims
to improve the national provision of pension payments by raising the retirement age.
These measures have been taken to eradicate the increasing use of pre-retirements
as a way of adjusting the workforce in companies (Expansio´n, 23-1-02; Eironline, 18-
01-02, c) and also aim to provide a mechanism for adjusting to emergent demographic
changes in Spain, thereby meeting the labour force requirements of employers. For
example, the government is currently working to modernise Vocational Training
(VT). VT has always been considered by Spanish Society inferior to other forms of
higher education. The reform proposals aim to re-orient and adapt VT initiatives to
meet the needs of employers. Relatedly, in late 2001 and due to the on-going inter-
national economic crisis, the Spanish Government responded by urging employer
organisations and trade unions to reach an agreement to reduce business cost and
reform collective bargaining. On December 20, 2001, CEOE, CEPYME (Spanish Con-
federation of Medium and Small-sized Enterprises) and the two major Trade Unions,
(C.OO and U.G.T) signed an agreement on wage moderation, measures to promote
internal corporate flexibility, and improve conflict regulation.
Lastly, and perhaps the most significant issue during 2001 in Spain was the Fourth
Labour Market Reform. The Spanish labour reforms between 1994 and 1997 aimed
to loosen labour market regulation. In 2001, and looking forward to improving the
1997 labour reform agreement, labour authorities encouraged social actors to achieve
new and voluntary agreements to enhance labour flexibility and stimulate job cre-
ation, particularly within multinational firms. However, the parties were unable to
agree and the 2001 reform was imposed by a ‘congressional decree’—a mechanism
to push legislation through when a Government has a Parliamentary majority. The
legislation aims to encourage permanent, long term and quality employment, to
enhance part-time jobs—as a way to successfully fulfil the flexibility requirements of
employers—and to guarantee transparency in the case of subcontracting.
In summary the material reviewed here accords with the conclusions of Muller-
Camen et al. (2001). For example, in Ireland country of origin practices associated
with US MNCs such as non-unionism challenge national systems of collective rep-
resentation and appear to be emerging as best practice for non-American firms. In
Germany the continued centrality of national regulation on merger and acquisition
activity and the regulatory capacity of works councils legislation illustrate how sub-
sidiaries of MNCs remain subject to national regulation in host countries. In Spain
the situation is similar although recent efforts by the Spanish state to loosen national
patterns of regulation illustrate variation in the regulatory capacity of national busi-
ness systems. This situation is mirrored in Ireland where efforts to re-regulate collec-
tive representation, contrast with Spanish strategies of de-regulation and are likely
to have only a marginal impact on trade union density. To take the debate forward
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section two examines country of origin and host country effects in two specific sectors
in the context of crisis and sector effects.
Sectoral developments in civil aviation and information
technology
Civil aviation exhibits three broad sectoral characteristics that inform management
strategy. First, the product is highly perishable—in crude economic terms the cost
of an unsold seat is the same as one that is occupied but cannot be re-couped. Second,
the sector is pro-cyclical, that is in periods of economic prosperity and boom the
load factor (percentage of seats occupied) runs ahead of the average whereas in
recession the load factor falls below the average. This is particularly important to
airlines such as British Airways where transatlantic traffic is significant especially
in business and first class bookings. Third, the reaction of multinational airlines to
unforeseen events stimulates short-term responses that reinforce the first two charac-
teristics. For example, the rapid downturn in economic activity in the US, the events
of September 11 and prior to that the Gulf war and the success (higher load factors
than MNC airlines) of low-cost airlines. The cumulative effect of the three character-
istics is manifest in short-term pressures to reduce capacity—grounding aircraft, cut-
ting the labour force and re-negotiating the pay-effort bargain—reducing hours and
pay, initiatives that may already be in place—or at least strategised as part of longer
term restructuring.
Contrasting restructuring responses to September 11: BA, British Midland
International (BMI), KLM and Lufthansa
Taken together BA, BMI, KLM and Lufthansa reduced capacity by 13% since
September 2001 (ILO, 2001). BA, BMI and KLM laid off over 10,000 workers or 10%
of their combined total workforce with BA recently announcing a further 6,000 redun-
dancies as part of its ‘Future Shape and Size’ strategy, bringing total BA redundancies
to 13,000 or 23% of its August 2001 workforce, (Financial Times, 14/2/02). In contrast
to BA’s announcement KLM’s chief executive announced a noticeable improvement
in the latter part of the last quarter of 2001 and suggested that KLM would raise
capacity where prudent to do so and was unlikely to lay off more employees,
(Financial Times 1/2/02). Equally, Lufthansa’a recent announcement of an expected
400 million operating profit this year indicate that the carrier has ridden out the
short-term financial effects of September 11 which saw operating profits plummet
to 28 million. Further the company is bringing 18 of the 43 aircraft it grounded in
the wake of September 11 back into service (Financial Times, 29/6/02).
To reduce operating capacity and labour levels airlines deploy a variety of stra-
tegies. For capacity airlines terminate less or unprofitable routes, ground aircraft tak-
ing some out of service, cancel or waive options on new orders in favour of franchis-
ing aircraft, re-fitting existing units or retrieval of mothballed units. In terms of
employment, airlines negotiate voluntary redundancies, announce compulsory
redundancies, reduce wage levels and/or introduce two-tier wage levels or use
cheaper overseas labour. Recent empirical work on civil aviation (Martinez Lucio
et al., 2001; Turnbull et al., 2000) demonstrates that in the search to maintain competi-
tiveness airlines are quite prepared to accept deterioration in established patterns of
employment relations, Whilst in broad support of this finding Blyton et al. (2001)
argues that trade unions are capable of engaging with restructuring to protect the
interests of workers. However, one danger for employees who avoid redundancy is
that the labour costs and standards associated with low-cost airlines may become
the benchmark for larger carriers. British Airways is currently negotiating pay cuts
for directors, senior managers and middle managers of between 5 and 15% and the
cancellation of management bonuses throughout 2002. At BMI BALPA negotiated a
50% work and pay deal for all its pilots in an effort to reduce the impact of proposed
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redundancies of 109 pilots, 20% of its total number (ATI, 2001). Vereingigung Cockpit,
the Lufthansa pilot’s union has indicated its willingness to accept a 10%+ pay cut to
help restore profitability. In addition to this Lufthansa management have proposed
a four-day week as a first measure to avoid staff redundancies.
In addition to the above measures there is speculation that BA is considering the
launch of a low-cost airline. In BA’s case this is remarkable due to its recent sell off
of Go, and although Ron Eddington BA’s CEO denies this the in-roads that low-cost
airlines have made into BA’s short haul routes is clearly evident in BA’s recently
announced ‘Future Shape and Size Strategy’. BA aims to reduce in-flight service costs
by using smaller aircraft and transfer some of its Gatwick operations to its low cost
franchisee GB Airways. However, such a move is likely to provoke difficult employ-
ment relations issues and appears to contradict BA’s previous branding strategy—
reflecting its failure—to target higher value business and first class loading. As Blyton
et al. (2001) point out BA was successful in launching Go as a low-cost subsidiary,
albeit an independent operator, primarily because Go negotiated a single union deal
with the AEEU and operated a level of labour flexibility that reduced labour costs
to around 80% of the BA standard. To negotiate similar cost-reductions for labour
within BA may prove much more problematic. However, since BA’s divestment of
Go in 2001 the current BA strategy for short-haul routes clearly aims to benchmark
low-cost carriers as the standard. Moreover, BA’s efforts to reduce costs on short
haul routes reflect wider difficulties in its globalization strategy such as a proposed
take-over of KLM and a transatlantic alliance with American Airways. Both
ambitions were recently frustrated by pronouncements made by EU courts that call
into question the legality of bilateral—state-to-state agreements within the EU. A
possible consequence of this is continued national re-structuring prior to EU-wider
regulation and intra EU consolidation.
Relatedly, BMIs recently negotiated work-sharing agreement with its pilots, which
aims to reduce cockpit crew job losses, is similar in substance to that negotiated by
Lufthansa. BMI is 20% owned by Lufthansa and BMI is also a member of the multi-
national Star Alliance fronted by Lufthansa and a member of the Star Alliance Euro-
pean Works Council. The similarity of BMI’s initial response, announcing 600 redun-
dancies—9% of its workforce, to BA’s response does exhibit country of origin
influences. However, the more measured response of negotiated work reductions
perhaps shadows those of Lufthansa, suggesting a more co-ordinated response per-
haps reflecting the growing significance of European Works Councils cutting across
country of origin effects. In addition to this the launch of BMI’s low cost carrier BMI
Baby that aims to compete head on with Go and Easyjet on short haul routes illus-
trates the pervasive impact of the low cost standard.
Corporatist reactions: Air France
Air France dominates civil aviation in France, in which the state retains a majority
shareholding. The business and industrial relations practices of Air France reveal a
semi-detached relationship with global trends in civil aviation resulting in national
patterns of regulation that appear to confirm existing observations on the nature of
the French business system. On the one hand, the wider impact of sectoral business
strategies is not unfamiliar. Air France is part of the Skyteam alliance, along with
Delta, Alitalia, Korean Air, and Czech airlines. Equally, it has joined other major
airlines in moving from a ‘point to point’ supply strategy to one based on the exten-
sive use of its Paris hub, (Forbes Global, 2001). On the other hand, domestic features
remain prevalent in the clear strategic importance of the airline to the state. This is
reflected in the states relative lack of interest in acquisitive expansion abroad, and
in the extent to which job security remains a significant constraint on management
strategy, even after the floatation of the company. This latter factor is best illustrated
by Air France’s response to the decline in the air traffic following September 11.
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Specific response to September 11
AF’s response to September 11 was undoubtedly less severe for its employees than
those of many other airlines. In the immediate aftermath, the company stopped new
investment in planes, retired 18 aircraft, and announced a recruitment freeze. Further,
an agreement to employ redundant staff from AOM-Air Liberte´ was put on hold.
While a French state-owned corporation, under a left-wing coalition continually
having to attempt to demonstrate its virtues in the field of employment policy might
be more likely than others to offer a relatively mild response to the crisis, contingent
business factors were nevertheless at play. Firstly, Air France had achieved four
straight years of profits from 1997 to 2000. Second, compared to other airlines, Air
France is currently relatively cash rich, and, having largely avoided participation in
the race to acquisitions of the 1990s, has relatively low debts. This of course does
not immunise Air France from the medium-term re-structuring challenges that are
likely to be posed if the market does not recover significantly, particularly as it retains
one of the highest ratios of labour costs to revenue.
However, almost regardless of short-term business factors, it is probably true to
argue that large-scale redundancies are politically unacceptable. Despite the fact that
the airline is partially privatised, the political fallout from lay-offs would be
considerable.
Given the fact that redundancies in profit-making firms remain deeply contro-
versial in France (EIRO, 2002) reductions in the workforce as a response to a short-
term crisis would be unlikely, regardless of the political persuasion of the Minister
of Transport.
The continuing near-monopoly of a state-owned flag carrier for international
flights, benefiting from close links with the State and the civil service, means that
the situation in France has perhaps changed less than elsewhere. Even with regard
to internal flights, these factors, combined with a fast and reliable rail network within
mainland France, have left the private sector at the margins and made the launch of
French-owned budget airlines more difficult to achieve. In this area, at least, the
French polity and the institutions of the national business system consolidate the
notion of a single “national champion”.
Civil aviation in Spain: Iberia
Iberia is the market leader in Spanish aviation and flies to 98 destinations in 39
countries. The company owns 200 planes and operates an average of 1,000 flights
daily. It is also one of the most qualified companies in the aircraft maintenance indus-
try and a member of the British Airways-American Airlines multinational ‘Oneworld’
alliance. Iberia has a 70% market share in the Spanish market (Anonymous, 2001).
Iberia is founder and part owner (27.92%) of Amadeus, one of two computerised
reservation systems in Europe with a world-wide prestige along with Lufthansa
Commercial Holding (27.92%) and Societe Air France (35.69%). The company also
owns Iberswiss, an airline catering Service Company, Cacesa, an ‘overnight ‘ trans-
portation company, and has stock in Tour Operators such as Viva Tours and
Tiempo Libre.
After 11 September, the AECA (Asociacio´n Espan˜ola de Compan˜ı´as Ae´reas)1 pre-
dicted that Spanish airlines would suffer a reduction in earnings of 240.40 million
and forecast layoffs of 15,000 workers unless the government provided financial relief
(Candia, 2001). In summary, measures announced by Spanish airlines after the 11
September were as follows; Iberia reduced capacity by 11% (ILO,2001) and increased
the tariffs by 8. Air Europa announced layoffs, reduced the number of flights and
cancelled purchase orders for new planes. Air Nostrum showed least reaction merely
1 The AECA is a non-profit industrial organisation, whose aims are the representation of private
airline companies in Spain and the European Community. It includes all private companies in Spain
except for Iberia.
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increasing tariffs by 14,75. Lastly, Spanair: reduced flights, but announced no lay-
offs, (El Mundo, 2001) Iberia’s net profits on year end were 50.2 million, four times
less than in the previous year (Expansio´n, 2002). However, Iberia’s management
remain and predict improved results in 2002 for the following reasons. First, the
company is not the largest operator in the routes affected. Second, the experiences
of Sabena and Swissair are unlikely, as Iberia’s financial structure is sound. Third,
Iberia has a stable workforce (since the last pilot’s dispute agreement has been
reached without any serious disagreement). However, whilst Iberia and other Span-
ish airlines appear less affected by recent events than other European airlines Iberia’s
situation must be placed in the wider context of globalization and intensified compe-
tition. Here the conclusions of Blyton et al. (1999), Turnbull et al. (2000) and Martinez
Lucio et al. (2001) are instructive. Case study evidence on Iberia suggests that greater
competition (from low-cost airlines and intensified global pressures) stimulates air-
line management into more assertive re-structuring strategies that erode ‘traditional’
terms and conditions of airline workers, often seeking to impose new operating pro-
cedures on the workforce. For example, in 1994 Iberia suffered strike action when it
attempted to introduce both pay and job cuts. The evidence suggests that deterio-
ration in management-labour relations and pay and terms and conditions of employ-
ment are an on-going process. For smaller Airlines the emergence of low-cost airlines
is likely to consolidate and reinforce this process as the low-cost standard becomes
the benchmark for European carriers on short-haul routes. It is unlikely that Iberia
can buck this trend over the longer term, hence management labour relations will
no doubt continue to deteriorate.
Information technology
In an annual review of this kind, attention to the information technology sector is
justified by two reasons. First, is its continued high public policy profile. Generating
core technology competencies and the stock of skills necessary for such a task have
been preoccupations of government departments for some time. The Blair govern-
ment has backed moves to develop a ‘knowledge-based’ economy in the UK and the
Department of Trade and Industry has devoted time to organising conferences on
the theme and resources to commissioned research and consultancy. In Spain too,
the government developed Info XXI, an action plan that comprises 300 different
initiatives and projects between 2001 and 2003, to implement an ‘Information Society’
for all the Spaniards. The prime emphasis being to increase the supply of skilled IT
professionals. At European level, the European Commission launched a High-Level
Task Force on Skills and Mobility in June 2001, with the aim of reducing barriers to
labour market mobility across Europe. Focus again was provided by the supply-side
needs of the ‘new economy,’ with particular analytical attention paid to the training
and employment of IT professionals (EIROnline, 2001a). Yet 2001 provided a jolt for
those depending predominantly on IT to rejuvenate employment and economies
since business news coverage has been dominated by the radical restructuring
initiated by IT companies, the second reason for their inclusion here. Taking these
two factors together, we see an industry which is highly internationalised but which
is structured in Europe now, unlike airlines, around a handful of key multinationals,
most of them American.
At one level, recession was the primary cause of restructuring. Early in the year,
industry specialists were warning that the rate at which IT investment is growing
was likely to fall back, for the first time since the invention of the desktop computer.
A survey of major US firms predicted growth at 8 per cent, rather than 11 per cent
the previous year (The Observer, 8 April 2001). But this masks a deeper underlying
crisis of manufacturing over-capacity. One reason for the favour heaped on the indus-
try by policy makers now is that it was seen throughout the 1980s as recession-proof.
Paradoxically, companies facing drops in revenue or profits pressures would invest
large sums of money in IT systems, provided this enabled them to reduce adminis-
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tration or employment costs. IT systems underlay trends towards managerial de-
layering, for example. But hardware markets in particular have become saturated
over time. Companies are less impressed with software innovation and the hardware
used to run it has become more reliable. The importance of 2001, therefore, is that
recession has compounded and accelerated changes in demand of a deeper nature.
Companies have extended their replacement cycles from three years to four (The
Observer, 11 November 2001) and the fall in hardware prices has increased to around
30 per cent per year (ibid.).
These underlying trends have impacted deeply on the configuration of the Euro-
pean IT industry, leaving it acutely vulnerable to crises of this sort. Archetypally,
the sector developed through the 1970s on the basis of ‘national champions.’ Leading
computing companies everywhere were linked closely with national governments,
not least through the research and development support they received for military
applications. In the US particularly, ‘the electronic digital computer itself was created
primarily for ballistics calculations and atom bomb analysis’. Leaps in British com-
puting technology appeared more benign. (The Guardian, 6 May 2001). The world’s
first commercial IT applications were developed at Manchester and Cambridge Uni-
versities to track stock for Lyons, the catering company, in their famous Corner
House Restaurants. Lyons themselves went on to manufacture further editions of
LEO (Lyons Electronic Office) for commercial sale right up to the early 1960s when
competition demanded the rationalisation of the eight computer manufacturers,
under government guidance, to produce ICL. Similar processes were evident in
France (Honeywell Bull) and Germany (Siemens).
Such policies have been largely abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s leaving Europe
substantially dependent on foreign direct investment for its computing technologies.
Much depends, of course, upon definitions of the sector and some exceptions remain.
Ericsson is a market leader in communications technologies and has sustained con-
siderable research and development in Sweden directly and by attracting collabor-
ators, like IBM. In core areas of computing hardware and software, however, Europe
does not perform well against the US and Japan. Britain is amongst the most com-
puter-literate economies, recording relatively high measures on PC ownership, inter-
net use, and employment in the industry. Yet critical weaknesses as a site of inno-
vation have been noted. Levels of investment in innovation and research are low;
the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on research and development
(R&D) declined through the 80s and 90s. The City is seen as a major obstacle to
innovation, making companies risk averse and focused on short-term market advan-
tages to the detriment of medium term capacity building (ibid., 16). The UK and
Germany were amongst the five OECD governments to have cut funding for R&D
during 90s (OECD, 2000: 5), the UK imposing the second most stringent reductions.
Ireland increased government support and Spain topped the list in terms of increases
to public funding, though from a relatively low-base (ibid.). Most European countries
are below the OECD average when it comes to recording patents in ICT areas. Spain
is the lowest of all, followed in ascending order by Germany, Ireland and then the
UK. Consequently, most European countries are net importers of technology, with
the exception of Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden). The US is the main net
exporter, followed by Japan.
The relative weakness of national champions in this context was highlighted
strongly during 2001. Fujitsu, the Japanese hardware manufacturer, acquired ICL in
1992 since which point management in the subsidiary was focused on the objective
of stock market flotation. Those plans were abandoned last year, followed closely by
the resignation of ICL’s Chief Executive, and the jettisoning of the ICL brand name
(The Guardian, 22 June 2001). In France, the state continued to own 17 per cent of
Bull (other significant shareholders include France Te´le´com, NEC and Motorola), and
offered loans totalling 150 million to it in 2000 and 2001. Nevertheless, the group
is currently undergoing a crisis that threatens its existence as an independent entity.
In the last year Bull faced selling off large units of its business activity and the humili-
ation of selling its corporate headquarters in Paris. The company was split into two
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entities during 2000, one covering the servers business (Bull Infrastructure and
Systems), the other covering its service activities (Integris). Yet by July 2001, the
management had announced its intention to sell off most of the non-French activities
of Integris to a smaller French firm Steria. This would leave Bull as a second-order
manufacturer of servers, facing competition from such giants as IBM and Sun
Microsystems.
The events of 2001 signal further important trends in terms of the kind of inno-
vation stemming now from foreign direct investment in the IT area. Relying upon
multinational companies to develop core technology competencies is an inherently
risky business. Innovations in production techniques and product quality have posi-
tive ramifications for host countries, but the research and development upon which
such advances depend takes place usually in the country of origin. Nearly half (40
per cent) of a representative sample of inward investors in the UK said that research
and development accounted for less than 1 per cent of total costs, 60 per cent spent
less than 2 per cent. One key explanation for this is the switch from manufacturing
to services, a long-term trend amongst the major IT multinationals that accelerated
in response to recession during 2001. The trend is most marked in the UK, a conse-
quence of the importance of financial services to the economy (a big purchaser of IT
services) and the large developing markets for IT contracts in the public sector. Of
the OECD countries, the UK is the third largest employer of IT workers, after the
US and Japan (Sharpe, undated: 1). Over half of those 1.11 million workers, though,
are employed in computing services rather than research or manufacturing. Under
Fujitsu’s ownership, ICL stopped manufacturing hardware in 1996 but, in dropping
the brand name last year, the position of the subsidiary as the European services
wing of the corporation has been made clear. In Spain too, IT services grew by 21
per cent overall during 2001, twice the rate for hardware and for consumables (both
around 10 per cent). Services now constitute half of the IT market and this proportion
is increasing. Software, a small part of the Spanish domestic market relative to other
European countries, has declined further from the peak associated with patches for
Y2K problems. In France, both IBM and Hewlett Packard have sub-contracted their
French PC manufacture to an American assembler, Sanmina SCI. This has also led
to the restructuring of other areas of employment previously covered by the large
IT firms; IBM for example, recently announced it was to stop the direct selling of
PCs, with the activity once again sub-contracted. IBM’s expansion in the UK during
2001, reportedly amounting to 2000 additional jobs, is focused exclusively in services
which is said to constitute about 40 per cent of the company’s turnover (The Guardian,
13 September 2001).
It is this rationalisation of manufacturing capacity that has propelled the IT multi-
nationals into the headlines during 2001. Whilst some companies collapsed or suf-
fered retrenchment, Gateway pulled out of manufacturing commitments in Ireland
and the UK for example, others sought refuge in mergers and acquisition. Compaq
sought merger with Hewlett Packard, much against the wishes of the latter’s found-
ing families who cited concerns about employee relations (The Observer, 17 March
2002). Seen within Compaq as aggressive horizontal integration enabling the com-
pany to compete head on with IBM, Hewlett-Packard opposed to the move on the
grounds that it would diffuse the company’s niche focus, on digital imaging, and
require it to compete in the hugely risky PC markets. Any subsequent loss of margin
would diminish the company’s ability to maintain corporate values based on trust
and employment security. Compaq had already announced employment cuts
amounting to more than 10 per cent of the global workforce (The Guardian, 12 July
2001) and job loss was a marked feature across the industry during 2001.
As discussed above, Ireland’s economic success in recent years was founded squar-
ely on the use of tax and broader policy incentives to attract foreign direct invest-
ment, a strategy implemented with particular success in IT. Looking at the overall
impact of the US downturn on the FDI sector in Ireland, we find the IDA end of
year analysis showing a net loss of 3,800 jobs. This figure is comprised of job creation
of 13,100 in the FDI sector, with concomitant job loss of 17,000. Overall, this rep-
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resents a decline of 2.7% in employment, the first such decline in fifteen years
(Dorgan, 2001). The information and communications technology (ICT) sector
appears to have suffered most with employment down by 10% in the year. Industrial
Relations News Reviews of Severance Settlements for 2000 and 2001 are instructive
here. In their review of severance settlements in the electronics and information tech-
nology sector for 2000 there were six settlements with just over 1000 job losses in
total. The 2001 review reveals 18 such severance settlements, covering over 3,600
employees (IRN, 2002). Prominent examples here have been the closure of Motorola’s
manufacturing plant in Dublin with a loss of 750 jobs and cutbacks at firms such as
Gateway with the announcement in August 2001 that it was to close its European
Headquarters in Dublin involving the loss of 900 jobs and a resultant drop of approxi-
mately £600m off Ireland’s annual export total. This represents the largest single
closure of an ICT company in Ireland in recent years. Significant also is the Intel
announcement postponing its planned expansion at its Irish facility in Leixlip, Co
Kildare, which would have created approximately 1,000 new jobs, along with the
seeking of 170 redundancies. Dell, one of the few PC manufacturers to have sustained
growth in 2001, increased employment in Ireland overall but this did not prevent
severance for approximately 200 employees who were released as part of “an
aggressive management of operating expenses” (Sheehan, 2001). The redundancies
applied to middle management, non-production line supervisors and administrat-
ive supports.
Focus on the inward investors understates the full extent of job loss, which has
also affected indigenous companies heavily focused on selling its products or services
to either the US market or to US owned firms. The year 2001 witnessed a series of
closures of Irish indigenous high tech firms, particularly in the software sectors, most
notably Ebeon, Nua, Rondomondo, Viasec, Formus Broadband, Oniva and Breakaway
Solutions while one of Ireland real stars in this sector, Baltimore Technologies, has
been forced to severely cut back its activities.
In Spain, recent increases in IT employment started to freeze as employment in
key areas was cutback. Hewlett-Packard illustrates the general trend. At the end of
December 2001, the company was named leader in the Personal Computers industry
in Spain for the eighth consecutive month, with a market share of 17.8% (HP, 2001).
The fiscal year also ended well for the company, with sales increasing 3.6 per cent
on the year to E1,900 (HP (2), 2001). During the same year, HP opened new offices
in Madrid, especially conceived for virtual jobs and to facilitate workers mobility
(HP (3), 2001). It also inaugurated its ‘Centre of Local Integration’, which comprises
the same production and laboratory characteristics of other European Integration
Centres. Those Centres are called ‘integrated’ as they intend to unify the three steps
of a product sale: conception, production and post sale service. At the same time,
though, the company announced the closure of its Barcelona plant and the outsourc-
ing of production, preferring to concentrate on higher value added business. The site
had been seen previously as an important and innovative development; focusing R&
D and production of the company’s large format printers in Spain contributed to
employment growth from 35 employees to 1,500 over the 80s and 90s (EIROnline,
2001). The company offered paid-dismissals and/or outplacement.
It is difficult in a review of this kind to comment authoritatively on the nature of
employment in those areas of the European IT industry that continues to thrive. The
kind of evidence available, however, does not support adequately the association
between information technology and increased skill-levels and ‘employability’
assumed often within policy discourses about the ‘knowledge-based’ economy.
Employee development remains prominent in those companies able to defend domi-
nant positions and operating in relatively regulated host-country environments. IBM
was only slightly affected by the crisis in the IT sector in 2001 and so played a special
role in the German IR system. IBM was among the first companies that signed a
company-level agreement on employee development, which is regarded as a corner-
stone of bargaining policy. An integral element of this contract is the right for each
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employee to discuss individual further training needs with supervisors once a year.2
But the IT workforce is hugely diverse but contains within it a large number of
routine occupations. Tasks undertaken by computer programmers have been re-
modelled and fragmented so that the cache, creative elements now is undertaken by
relatively few. For the rest, ‘many computer workers possess but an aura of skill:
their daily work is little more than specialized clerical labour’. The broader trends
indicated here, particularly the growing importance in Europe of IT services, is
suggestive of expansion in these kinds of areas overall rather than deep technological
innovation taking place in innovation hubs, like Sweden. Possibly this explains the
co-existence in countries like Spain of sustained recruitment difficulties and relatively
low levels of pay. Overtures to staff adopted by many of the leading multinationals
have tended to lean towards cost-control rather than more strategic orientations to
skill and remuneration. In July 2001, for example, Hewlett Packard asked its
employees worldwide to contribute to a global ‘voluntary payroll savings pro-
gramme’ (EIROnline, 2001b). Staff were able to choose between one of four options:
to accept a 10 per cent pay cut for four months; to accept a 5 per cent pay cut for
four months and to renounce four days annual leave entitlement; to renounce eight
days annual leave; or, finally, to agree to none of the other three options. The com-
pany declared the tactic a success, leading to savings of $130million over the financial
year, but this did not prevent the subsequent announcement of 6,000 job losses, some
6.5 per cent of the workforce globally.
In contrast to airlines, restructuring of this kind faces relatively few obstacles in
the IT industry since unionisation and joint regulation is limited relative to others.
Amongst the IT companies investing in Ireland, union avoidance has become such
a prominent feature that it is said to have contributed to the overall decline in union
recognition in that country. Unions in Britain have had no influence over restructur-
ing. Noting the disproportionate impact of Fujitsu’s restructuring plans on the British
workforce (cuts of 13 per cent were proposed for the UK, as against a 9 per cent
global average), MSF was able only to complain about the relative ease with which
employers in Britain can make workers redundant (The Guardian, 12 December 2001).
In Spain too, workers in IT are not covered by the major sectoral agreements and
collective bargaining remains relatively incipient, restricted to embryonic develop-
ments in limited areas, e.g., telemarketing.3 Unions opposing closures at Lucent and
Hewlett-Packard have been able to ease the transition for workers but have not been
able to prevent closures. Their complaints that Lucent’s closure effectively ended the
possibility of high-tech production in the region of Madrid proved ultimately to be
futile (Expansio´n, 22-10-2001).
Even in Germany, sectoral collective agreements do not apply, either because IT
companies are not members of the employers’ associations or because they are
covered by more flexible firm-level agreements bargained directly with the unions.
Hewlett Packard has not been covered by any form of collective agreement since it
left the employers’ federation in 1974. This may be one factor explaining the relatively
acquiescent response of HP’s German workforce to the cost saving described above.
Despite opposition from IG Metall, emphasising the short-termist nature of HP’s
response, nearly 94 per cent of the 6,000 employees responded to the letter, the
majority (80 per cent) agreeing to one or other of the cuts (EIRO, 2001b).
2 A second important company agreement, though not in the IT sector, was concluded between the
newly created union ver.di and Ranstad, the Dutch temporary employment agency. It applies to 21,000
employees and settles wage increases from May 2001. Even though it was expected that the agree-
ment might act as a model for the whole temporary employment sector, changes in the Ministry of
Labour’s “Job-Aqtiv-Gesetz” reignited the old dispute around the question as to whether employees
have to be paid according to the principles of the employment agency or its client (FAZ, 2001h).
3 In June 2001 strikes and other industrial action in Spain’s telemarketing sector took place. Trade
unions sought the resumption of negotiations over a new national sectoral collective agreement and
the introduction of improvements in pay and conditions. The action was well supported by the 40,000
workers in the sector, 90% of whom are employed under temporary contracts.
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Conclusions: home country, host country, and sector effects in
the context of crisis
What then can the key developments of 2001–2 tell us about the behaviour of multi-
nationals in Europe? Ambition in a review of this kind must be tailored to the kind
of evidence available but some interesting themes for further research are apparent.
First, in both civil aviation and information technology pressures can be discerned
that are sector specific. The shocks that September 11 2001 generated for airlines
constitutes a sector effect so specific and extreme that it would be hard to replicate
elsewhere. A vast and valuable airspace became inaccessible for nearly a week gener-
ating substantial loss of revenues and diminishing demand on transatlantic routes
for the medium term. These shock effects established further pressures towards con-
vergence in corporate strategies. One key development, common across carriers, is
the rise to prominence of low-cost airlines and their role as a downward ratchet
on terms and conditions of employment within ‘core’ businesses. Labour standards,
ticketing and sales strategies and more selective routing in national carriers are
benchmarking those of low-cost carriers. Here agreed patterns of job regulation—
working practices, manning levels and employment levels appear as uncompetitive
constraints as management introduce further rounds of low-cost inspired cost-cutting
to raise productivity and compete more directly with low-cost carriers but more perti-
nently maintain shareholder value, (see Martinez et al., 2001).
Similar product related effects were apparent in information technology, where
the novelty of declining demand for personal computers was exacerbated by
recession during 2001. In the absence of product market regulation, as in civil avi-
ation, the rationalising effects in most contexts were to practically eradicate the
already weakened inclination to foster national champions, and to consolidate the
position of a handful of US and Japanese multinationals. The drive towards ‘knowl-
edge-based’ economies, of the kind favoured by European policy makers at national
and EU level, is dependent to an overwhelming degree on the continued influx of
foreign direct investment. Events during 2001, however, qualify the more optimistic
expectations of enhanced employment prospects and skill development. Except for
companies dominant in their sub-sector, Microsoft and Intel for example, the general
trend in information technology was towards job reduction and the worsening of
terms and conditions of employment. Obvious questions arise about such strategies
in an industry that experiences recurrent problems with skill shortages. Explanations
point first to the inherent irrationality of short-term responses to crisis in the context
of weak regulation at sectoral level. IT companies operating in Europe tend not to
participate in industry bargaining, even in relatively highly regulated economies like
Germany. Where labour costs are not taken out of competition in this way, short-
term fluctuations in demand will be reflected in labour strategies. As important, and
of deeper concern to policy makers, is the underlying shift towards investment in IT
services and away from research and manufacturing. To the extent that 2001 acceler-
ated such trends, the prospects for technology-driven recovery across Europe look
bleaker than they did previously.
In both cases, however, sectoral responses were refracted to a significant degree
by home and host country influences. Supposed ‘deregulation’ in civil aviation, both
in the US and in Europe, is more accurately termed ‘re-regulation’ (Martinez-Lucio
et al., 2001). The year did witness some movement towards the kind of European
integration that has long been predicted; the collapse of Sabena and Swiss Air argu-
ably indicating the demise of national champions within the industry. Elsewhere,
however, patterns of national and international regulation continued to permit
government influence over their ‘flag-carriers’ and companies themselves to seek
shelter. Job loss at Lufthansa and Air France were markedly less pronounced than
in airlines relatively exposed to full commercial pressures, like British Airways.
The salience of host country environments, and their interaction with broader
trends, is illustrated by developments in information technology. Differences
between European states persist, in terms of their openness to FDI and the context
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in which it comes to operate. Ireland exemplifies an approach to capacity building
in technology reliant substantially on overtures to multinational companies. The
extent to which undoubted success enjoyed so far can be sustained in the light of
international restructuring, and at what cost for patterns of domestic industrial
relations, is but one of several interesting research questions for the future. By con-
trast, Sweden and Germany (to a lesser extent), have used investment in research
and development, coupled with selective labour market reform, to develop ‘techno-
logical hubs’ around existing indigenous companies, like Ericsson for example. Con-
figurations of this kind may prove more successful in attracting collaborative research
and development and complex manufacturing capacity.
Variations between host-countries in labour market regulation have also mitigated
to some extent the short-termist instincts of the IT multinationals. In France, for
example, protective labour legislation, compulsory trade union recognition, and a
wider societal antipathy to the announcement of redundancies among profit-making
enterprises combined to make rationalisation a slower and more controversial pro-
cess than in countries with more flexible labour markets, even if they did not combine
to overcome wider sectoral trends completely. One significant brake on collective
redundancies in the foreign-owned IT sector in France has been the fact that many
such companies signed collective agreements in the late 1990s. These agreements,
offered employment security, or at least a guarantee of total workforce size, in return
for pay restraint in a sector with many skills shortages. Additionally, recently passed
legislation prevents collective redundancies prior to negotiations on the 35-hour
working week. Thus, Compaq’s initial stated intention, when announcing global
redundancy programmes in July 2001, was to divide the reduction of 830 jobs equally
between Germany, France and the UK. But union representatives in France pointed
to a collective agreement signed in 1999, guaranteeing a French workforce of 1,400.
As the workforce had already declined below this number, and collective agreements
have legal force, the unions were able to threaten the firm with civil court action.
While the protection that this offer may not be long-term, the situation can be con-
trasted to the UK case, where a non-unionised workforce saw 800 jobs lost as a result
of outsourcing to a Taiwanese firm operating in the Czech Republic (TGWU, 2001).
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